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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

STANLEY L. WADE #
Plaintiff-Appellant,

]\

Case No. 920221-CA

vs.

;
i

Priority No.

16

F. C. STANGL III,
Defendant-Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
STANLEY L. WADE

INTRODUCTION
This brief is being submitted on behalf of Appellant Stanley
L. Wade

(hereinafter "Wade").

The purpose for this brief is to

respond to matters raised in the brief filed by Appellee, F. C.
Stangl III (hereinafter "Appellee Brief")
In this brief, Wade incorporates the facts and arguments set
outlined in his original brief and will expressly limit his
response to the arguments of Appellee, F. C. Stangl III
(hereinafter

"Stangl").

While Stangl has introduced several issues which this court
must consider, nonetheless, Wade believes the facts are

1

sufficiently stated in its Appellant Brief, so appropriate
responses will be made in the argument portions of this brief.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
POINT I,
STANGL'S OBJECTIONS TO EXHIBITS UTILIZED IN WADE'S
APPELLANT BRIEF ARE PARTIALLY INCORRECT AND OTHERWISE
IRRELEVANT
Stangl objects to five exhibits.

Two of these and part of a

third were, in fact, admitted into evidence by the trial court.
The remaining issues are proved by other admitted evidence.
POINT II,
WADES' ALLEGED DEFAULT IN FAILING TO REPLY TO STANGL'S
COUNTERCLAIM IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS ACTION
The central issue before the trial court and before this
Court on appeal is what constituted Wade's share of property
taxes.

This issue was not involved in Stangl's counterclaim and

therefore was not defaulted.
POINT III,
STANGL'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS SHOWN
BY THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE IGNORES THE EVIDENCE
Judicial rulings which are erroneous, numerous, and
continuous, coupled with other evidence of bias establish
prejudicial bias.

Such rulings and evidence were so prevalent in

this case thcLt Wade was unable to obtain a fair trial.
2

Such bias

requires this Court to remand Wade's case for a new trial before
an impartial judge.
POINT IV.
STANGL'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
THE ISSUES OF AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND ORAL
MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT DISREGARDS APPLICABLE LAW
The admission of new issues at trial under Rule 15(b) of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is allowed only when the parties
consent and the issue is fully tried.

Two new issues were

introduced by Stangl at trial without either of these
requirements being met.

Wade did not impliedly or expressly

consent to the introduction of the issues.

Further, the issues

were not fully tried because the trial court prevented Wade from
introducing crucial defense arguments.
POINT V,
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES1
INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT WAS TO
APPORTION TAXES BASED UPON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY
EACH PARTY
Stangl's statement of proper standards of review contends
that the trial court's finding of intent must be upheld unless
clearly erroneous.

This statement is incorrect.

Because the

court's finding of intent was based upon documentary evidence it
should be considered a legal conclusion and reviewed for
correctness.
3

Even if the trial court's finding was a finding of fact, it
was not based upon competent or substantial evidence and was
clearly erroneous.
Stangl also claims that the court's finding of intent is
supported by the doctrine of practical construction.

However,

practical construction requires that both parties construe the
contract the same.

This requirement was not met in this case and

therefore the doctrine does not support the court's finding.
POINT VI.
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE PROPER
ALLOCATION OF TAXES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION
The trial court's reliance upon an alleged oral contract or
oral modification of the original contract, or upon the parties
alleged intent under the original contract was improper.

The

trial court was required to follow the Supreme Court's
instructions to determine the amount of taxes which had actually
accrued to the property under the doctrine of equitable
conversion.

4

ARGUMENT
POINT I.
STANGL'S OBJECTIONS TO EXHIBITS UTILIZED IN WADE'S
APPELLANT BRIEF ARE PARTIALLY INCORRECT AND OTHERWISE
IRRELEVANT
In his statement of the facts, Stangl contends that Exhibits
A, B# E# I and K of Wade's Appellant Brief were not introduced
into evidence at trial. Appellee Brief, p. 7.

This is partially

incorrect and otherwise irrelevant.
Exhibit A, Wade's March 25, 1990 affidavit, was admitted by
the court into evidence.

Tr. p. 75.

Exhibit B, the Supreme

Court's Remittitur, was admitted into evidence.

Tr. p. 45. The

first of three parts of Exhibit K, Schwenke's Affidavit, was
admitted into evidence.

Tr. p. 79.

The admissibility of the remaining exhibits to which Stangl
objects does not affect the arguments made by Wade.

The purposes

for which Wade utilized Exhibit's E, I and the second and third
parts of exhibit K are met by other evidence admitted at trial.
Exhibit E, Partial Satisfaction of Judgment, July 6, 1992,
was used on pages seven and nine to show that Wade has paid
Stangl $106,386.97 in taxes, interest and fees.

This fact is not

essential to any argument made by Wade.
Exhibit I, Stangl's Memorandum in Opposition to Plaintiff's
Motion for Summary Judgment, was utilized on page eight to
5

establish that Stangl calculated the allocation of taxes based
upon proportionate acreage.
transcript•

This fact is reflected in the

See, e.g.. Tr. 22,

The second and third parts of Exhibit K# a page from Wade's
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment,
and a property valuation statement from the Salt Lake County
Assessor's office, were used on page 19 to show the proportion of
taxes which Wade was paying.

These proportions are also

established by the transcript.

The proportion of acreage is set

forth on page 56 as 70%. The proportion of value is easily
established by comparing the values identified at trial of
$206,100 for Wade's property and $251,000 for Stangl's property.
Tr. pp. 53-54. Based upon these figures, Wade's parcel
constituted 45% of the value of the aggregated parcel and
Stangl's constituted 55%.

These results are sufficiently close

to those cited from Schwenke's Memorandum in Support of
Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment to not alter the
arguments.
POINT II.
WADES' ALLEGED DEFAULT IN FAILING TO REPLY TO STANGL'S
COUNTERCLAIM IS IRRELEVANT TO THIS ACTION
Stangl argues that the trial court's judgment must be
affirmed in all respects based upon the court's finding that Wade
6

was in default r e l a t i v e to the issues raised in Stangl's original
counterclaim.
merit.

Appellee Brief, p. 16.

This argument i s without

The issue before the t r i a l court was what constituted

Wade's share of the property taxes.

This issue was not addressed

in the counterclaim and t h e r e f o r e was not defaulted. 1
Stangl attempts to convince t h i s Court that the t r i a l
court's finding of default formed an independent and "separate
basis" for the court's e n t i r e judgment.2

However, the court's

finding of default was made only to establish that Wade did in
fact owe h i s share of t a x e s .

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, p. 8, #15 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C).

The central

issue of what c o n s t i t u t e d Wade's share of the taxes was the
subject of e n t i r e l y separate findings t o t a l l y unrelated to the
above-mentioned d e f a u l t .

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, pp. 4-6, #7-9 and 11 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C).
Therefore, the c o u r t ' s finding of default was not an independent
basis for i t s judgment.

S t a n g l ' s c o u n t e r c l a i m sought 1) d i s m i s s a l of Wade's Complaint with
p r e j u d i c e ; 2) reimbursement of Wade's share of the property t a x e s and i n t e r e s t
thereon a t the l e g a l r a t e , and 3) a t t o r n e y s f e e s and c o s t s . Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, p . 8, #15 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C).
2

Stangl s t a t e s t h a t "in accordance with the t r i a l c o u r t ' s f i n d i n g s ,
the judgment a g a i n s t Wade should be affirmed i n a l l r e s p e c t s because of Wade's
f a i l u r e t o r e p l y t o t h e c o u n t e r c l a i m a g a i n s t him.11 Appellee Brief, p . 16.
7

POINT III,
STANGL'S ARGUMENT THAT THERE WAS NO PREJUDICIAL BIAS
SHOWN BY THE JUDGE IN THIS CASE IGNORES THE EVIDENCE
The evidence of judicial bias was so extensive in this case
that the case should be remanded for a new trial.

The judge

himself raised the issue of recusal based upon bias sua sponte
because he was aware there were problems which could affect his
judgment.

This creates a sufficient concern to require this

court to "carefully scrutinize the record to see that no
injustice has been done. . . "3

48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 730.

Stangl argues that such prejudicial bias cannot be
considered by this Court because Wade's attorney failed to object
at trial.

However, counsel's failure to object at trial may be

excused when necessary to prevent a "manifest injustice."

State

v. Becker, 803 P.2d 1290, 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990); State v.
John. 770 P.2d 994, 995 (Utah 1989).

Failing to allow an appeal

based upon judicial bias would cause such a manifest injustice.
Wade's counsel at trial was new to the case and was unaware of
the prior difficulties between the judge and Wade's previous
attorney's.

If he had been aware of the history of the case, he

would unquestionably have objected to the judge's handling of the
matter.

As it was, Wade's counsel consented to the judge's

3
People Ex rel. Little v. Saint Louis Merchants' Bridge Co.. 118 N.E.
733 (111. 1918); Aldridae v. State, 342 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. 1960).

8

continued handling of the case on the assumption that the prior
difficulties would not extend to a bias against Wade himself.
"Manifest injustice" requires that the error be obvious to
the trial court and that it affect the substantial rights of a
party.

State v. Becker. 803 P.2d at 1293 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

There was extensive and obvious evidence of judicial bias in this
case, as a brief review of the facts of the case shows.
The trial judge allowed Stangl to introduce crucial new
issues for the first time at trial.

However, he then refused to

allow Wade to rebut the issues on the grounds that the defenses
had not been raised previously.

(A full discussion is included

in Wade's Appellate brief, pp. 15-22.)
The judge ignored Supreme Court statements that the contract
did not impose any contractual duty upon Wade to pay taxes.
Instead, the judge found Wade liable for taxes specifically based
upon an alleged contractual agreement, or contractual intent.
The judge failed to apportion taxes under the doctrine of
equitable conversion as instructed by the Supreme Court.
Instead, the judge based his determination of tax apportionment
upon Stangl's calculations of proportionate acreage, which failed
to account for the significantly higher value of Stangl's
property.

9

In determining to discredit Wade's testimony, the judge
leaned heavily on comments pertaining to a prior fraud proceeding
Wade had been involved in.

He used his disbelief of Wade's

testimony to justify his decision that the parties contractual
intent or agreement was to allocate taxes based upon acreage.
Such information should not have been relevant to the case.
According to the Supreme Court, the issue was what portion of the
taxes actually accrued to Wade's land, an issue of valuation, not
credibility or intent.
The judge was aware of evidence that Wade's prior counsel,
Schwenke, had altered a $52,000 check received from Stangl for
Wade and cashed it himself.

Tr. p. 42. The judge seemed to

believe that Schwenke had forged dates on court documents.
pp. 44, 45.
the bar.

Tr.

He was aware that Schwenke had been suspended from

Letter from A. Paul Schwenke to Judge Michael Murphy,

dated November 15, 1990, Court Record, Vol. II, p. 550; Letter
from Judge Michael Murphy to A. Paul Schwenke, dated November 27,
1990, Court Record, Vol. II, p. 551. There was no evidence that
Wade receiv€id the money, and it was questionable whether Schwenke
was still representing Wade at the time he received the check.
Tr. pp. 43-48. Notwithstanding the character of Schwenke and the
lack of evidence that Wade had received the check, the judge

10

found that Schwenke was Wade's agent for purposes of receiving
$52,000.
In addition to being obvious to the trial court, the
judicial bias in this case unquestionably affected substantial
rights.

Judicial bias resulted in Wade being held liable for a

much greater portion of taxes than he would have been under a
determination based upon the law.
As stated in Wade's appellate brief, "[a] litigant is
entitled to a trial before a judge who is not biased or
prejudiced. . ."

48A C.J.S. § 108, p. 728. A judge is required

to recuse himself when his impartiality might reasonably be
questioned.

ABA Code of Jud.Conduct Canon 3, subd. C(l)(b).

Stangl cites a case stating that "[t]he rulings of a judge, even
if erroneous, numerous, and continuous[,] are not sufficient in
themselves to show bias or prejudice."

Appellee Brief, p. 21,

citing Riva Ridge Apartments v. Robert G. Fisher Co.. Inc., 745
P.2d 1034, 1037 (Colo. Ct. App. 1987) (emphasis added).

However,

not only were numerous judicial rulings in this case erroneous,
but there were also statements made by the judge himself
regarding potential biases as a result of problems with prior
counsel.

In short, there was more than sufficient evidence of a

lack of judicial impartiality to require the judge to recuse
himself from handling the case.

11

The agency issue is of particular concern.

As mentioned

above, at the beginning of the trial, the judge recused himself
from deciding an issue on the grounds that it was "intrinsically
intertwined with prior counsel for [Wade]."

Tr. p. 2.

The issue

regarding the $52#000 check was also unquestionably intertwined
with prior counsel and the judge should have again recused
himself from deciding this issue, at the least.
POINT IV,
STANGL'S CONTENTION THAT THE COURT PROPERLY ADMITTED
THE ISSUES OF AN ALLEGED ORAL CONTRACT AND ORAL
MODIFICATION OF THE CONTRACT DISREGARDS APPLICABLE LAW
As discussed extensively in Wade's Appellate Brief, two of
the three grounds upon which the trial court rested in reaching
its judgment were improperly admitted for the first time at
trial.4

Stangl attempts to counter this fact on the grounds that

Wade failed to object at trial to the new issues.

However, as

explained in Wade's Appellate Brief, failure to object cannot
constitute consent to try a new issue where the party had no
reason to know that a new issue was being introduced.

See Wade's

Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18.

Specifically, the issues of an oral contract or oral modification of
the contract creating an obligation to apportion taxes based upon proportionate
acreage. See Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18.

12

Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that a new issue can only be introduced at trial where the
parties consent and the issue is fully tried•

Neither of these

requirements were met in this case.5
Stangl attempts to argue that the issue of an oral contract
was tried with Wade's express consent because Wade utilized
testimony regarding "oral agreements11 throughout the trial and in
his closing.

Appellee Brief, pp. 25-27.

without merit.

This contention is

Wade utilized evidence pertaining to alleged oral

agreements because they applied to the issue of the parties'
intent under the contract.

His use of testimony pertaining to

these alleged conversations was never applied to any discussion
of an oral contract or oral modification because he never
realized those issues had been introduced.
Stangl contends that the issues of an oral contract or
modification were fully tried.

The relevant test is "whether the

opposing party had a fair opportunity to defend and whether it
could offer additional evidence if the case were retried on a
different theory."

Colman v. Colman. 743 P.2d 782, 785 (Utah Ct.

App. 1987), citing R. A, Pohl Constr. Co. v. Marshall. 640 F.2d
266, 267 (CA10 1981).

In this case, Wade could have introduced

5

These issues were extensively briefed in Wade's Appellate Brief and
will only be summarily reviewed as they pertain to specific points raised by
Stangl's Appellee Brief. See. Appellate Brief, pp. 15-18.

13

evidence, and in fact tried to introduce evidence, to prove that
the statute of frauds and the statute of limitations barred these
new issues.

Thus, the Colman test was not met and these issues

were not fully tried.

See Appellate Brief, pp. 16-18 for a full

discussion.
Stangl also contends that the statute of frauds and statute
of limitations defenses were properly excluded by the court as
they had not been raised previously.

He points to the fact that

Wade conceded at trial that the statute of frauds and statute of
limitations defenses applied only if they had been raised
previously.

Appellee Brief, p. 26.

However, Wade's comment

only, again, emphasizes the fact that he was unaware new issues
had been introduced.

He thought the defenses applied to the

existing issue of the parties' intent.

If that had been the

case, the defenses would have been waived if not pleaded
previously.

In actuality, because Stangl did not raise the

issues of an oral contract or an oral modification of the
contract prior to trial, the defenses could not have been pleaded
earlier and were not waived.
In sum, the requirements of Rule 15(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure for the introduction of a new issue were not met
and the issues were improperly admitted.

Wade did not impliedly

consent to the introduction of the two new issues, and was

14

prevented from introducing evidence crucial to defending the
issues*
POINT V,
THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY DETERMINED THAT THE PARTIES'
INTENT WITH RESPECT TO THE WRITTEN AGREEMENT WAS TO
APPORTION TAXES BASED UPON THE AMOUNT OF AREA OWNED BY
EACH PARTY
Stangl argues that the court's determination of the parties'
intent under the contract is a finding of fact, subject only to
limited review and reversible only when clearly erroneous.
statement is incorrect.

This

Because the court's finding of an intent

to allocate taxes based upon acreage was specifically based upon
documentary evidence6, its findings should be considered legal
conclusions and subject to review for correctness.

Further, even

if the decision was a finding of fact, this Court must review the
findings to determine if they were "based on substantial,
competent, admissible evidence."

Finally, even under a clearly

erroneous standard, the trial court's decision was wrong.
A.

The Trial Court's Finding of Intent Was a Legal
Finding. Subject to Review for Correctness

A judgement based upon written documents, such as this one,
should be subject to review for correctness, just as conclusions

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp. 4-5, #8 and 9, (See
Appellate Brief Exhibit C).

15

based upon written contracts are.

Interpretations of contract

language present an appellate court with a question of law which
is reviewed for correctness.

Bettinger v. Bettincrer, 793 P.2d

389 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), citing Regional Sales Agency. Inc. v.
Reichert. 784 P.2d 1210, 1213 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).

This

standard is appropriate because an appellate court is capable of
considering the contents of a written contract and is not
required to evaluate the credibility of witnesses or other
information not directly available on appeal.

This capability is

equally present where a trial court finding is based upon other
types of written documents.

Thus, findings based upon such

evidence should be subject to this same standard of review.
B.

The Trial Court's Finding of Intent Was Not Based
Upon Competent or Substantial Information and Was
Clearly Erroneous

Even if the trial court's finding of an intent to allocate
taxes based upon acreage is not subject to review for
correctness, the finding was still wrong.

Appellate courts are

required to review findings and determine if they are "based on
substantial, competent, admissible evidence."

Bettinger v.

Bettinaer. 793 P.2d at 392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

The finding of

intent in this case was not based upon such evidence.
its finding was clearly erroneous.

16

Further,

All of the evidence available

to the trial court relevant to this issue, taken together, fails
to reasonably support the trial court's finding.
The evidence available to the court pertaining to the issue
of intent included:

letters sent from Stangl to Wade reflecting

his calculations of apportionment based upon acreage7; testimony
from Wade pertaining to three conversations between himself and
Stangl wherein he let Stangl know apportionment based upon
acreage was unacceptable8; testimony from Stangl pertaining to
one of those conversations wherein he claims Wade agreed to such
apportionment9; and three checks written by Wade after 1978 for
taxes10.
Viewing this evidence in the light most favorable to the
trial court's finding of intent, if the court credited only
Stangl's testimony pertaining to the parties' discussion of taxes
and found that the three checks written by Wade were evidence of
an agreement, it could have reached the conclusion it did.
However, such reliance would be clearly erroneous as against the
weight of the evidence.

Tr. pp. 22-23.
Tr. pp. 65-67.
Tr. pp. 11-13, and 36.
Tr. p. 89.

17

The letters written by Stangl cannot show a joint intent to
allocate taxes based upon acreage because there was no indication
in any of these that Wade consented to the apportionment.
Thus, these letters are not "competent11 evidence to support the
court's finding and do not satisfy the Bettinger test.
Bettinaer. 793 P.2d at 392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
Placing heavy emphasis upon testimony introduced by Stangl
pertaining to one conversation in which Wade allegedly agreed to
allocate taxes based upon acreage is clearly unreasonable.

The

alleged agreement purported to make Wade responsible for 70% of
the taxes, when his property was valued at only 45% of the value
of the combined property.

See p. 2 for computation.

Such

testimony introduced by Stangl is clearly self-serving.

Self-

serving declarations of a party cannot establish the liability of
another party.

31A C.J.S. Evidence § 216; White v. Delano. 665

S.W.2d 67, 70 (Mo. Ct. App. 1984); TfrUert Tppl fr Eng'g, CP,,
Inc.. v. McClain, 579 S.W.2d 751, 758 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979);
National Importing & Trading Co. v. E.A. Bear & Co.. 155 N.E. 343
(111. 1925).

Thus, the court's reliance upon this evidence would

be clearly erroneous.
The three checks arguably support the trial court's finding
that the parties originally intended to apportion taxes based
upon relative acreage.

However, this evidence is hardly
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"substantial", as required by Bettinger.
392, (Utah Ct. App. 1990).

Bettinaer. 793 P. 2d at

This i s e s p e c i a l l y true where t h i s

finding goes d i r e c t l y a g a i n s t the testimony of both witnesses and
the court's own finding t h a t the parties original intent was to
have the properties separately assessed by the taxing authorities
based upon value.

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, pp.

3-4, #6 (See Appellate Brief Exhibit C); Tr. p. 11.
Further, payment of t h r e e checks i s consistent with Wade's
b e l i e f that the property would soon be divided for tax purposes
as o r i g i n a l l y intended by the p a r t i e s .

The checks were written

on the mistaken assumption that Stangl would have the properties
separated for tax purposes.

Payment on the basis of acreage was

meant to be a temporary measure and was never intended to
prospectively resolve the issue of a l l o c a t i o n .
If the court r e l i e d upon the existence of the three checks
to support S t a n g l ' s testimony, i t again r e l i e d upon s e l f - s e r v i n g
evidence.

The checks were written on the basis of acreage only

because of S t a n g l ' s f a i l u r e to perform as intended by the
parties 1 1 .

The t r i a l c o u r t ' s reliance upon such evidence i s

Throughout S t a n g l ' s Appellee Brief, he states that the "taxing
authority f a i l e d to segregate the two parcels of property for assessment
purposes." Appellee Brief pp. 6, 9, 24, 33. However, the only reason the taxing
authorities did not separate the properties was because Stangl did not request
them to do so. See Tr. p . 57. Stangl could have, at any time over the nine years
in which payment was disputed, had the properties separated for tax purposes as
the parties intended and avoided this lawsuit.
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clearly erroneous as the checks demonstrate no evidence of a
meeting of the minds regarding future allocation and are
insufficient to support a judgment.
C.

The Doctrine of Practical Construction Does Not
Support the Trial Court's Finding of Intent

Stangl next argues that the doctrine of practical
construction supports the trial court's finding of intent.
Appellee Brief, pp. 35-38.

However, the doctrine of practical

construction specifically requires that "each party shall have
placed the same construction on the contract."

Builough v. Sims.

400 P.2d 20, 23 n.4 (Utah 1965), citing Hodges Irrigation Co. v.
Swan Creek Canal Co.. 181 P.2d 217 (1947).

In this case, the

parties did not construe the contract the same.
Stangl admits that the original intent of the parties was to
have the properties separated and taxed by the authorities based
on value.

Tr. p. 11. However, he claims the intent changed and

that the parties construed the contract to require allocation of
taxes based upon acreage.

Wade's understanding was that the

original intent to separate the properties never changed.

He

paid taxes based upon acreage only as a temporary measure while
waiting for Stangl to have the properties separated as originally
planned.
The constructions which the two parties placed upon the
contract with respect to tax apportionment was clearly not the
20

same.

Thus# the doctrine of practical construction does not

apply and does not support the trial court's findings of intent.
POINT VI,
THE TRIAL COURT WAS REQUIRED TO DETERMINE THE PROPER
ALLOCATION OF TAXES UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF EQUITABLE
CONVERSION
Stangl attempts to rebut Wade's argument that the trial
court was required to determine the proper allocation of taxes
based upon the doctrine of equitable conversion by pointing to
the arguments raised at trial.

However, even if additional

issues were litigated, the trial court was still required to
follow the Supreme Court's instructions.

As discussed in Wade's

Appellate Brief, the Supreme Court Remittitur instructed the
trial court to determine the taxes which were actually
attributable to Wade's property under the doctrine of equitable
conversion12.

The trial court failed to follow these

instructions and instead based the obligation on an alleged oral
contract or contractual intent.

This case should be remanded for

a determination of taxes actually attributable to the property
under the doctrine of equitable conversion as required by the
Supreme Court.

12

Appellate Brief, pp. 25-18f discussing Supreme Court Remittitur,
admitted into evidence, Tr. p.45.
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Pertaining to Stangl's claim that the theories actually
relied upon by the trial court were properly admitted into the
trial, Wade admits that the issue of contractual intent was
litigated.

However, as discussed, the court's conclusion on this

issue was clearly erroneous.
As discussed extensively above and in Wade's Appellate
Brief, the issues of an oral contract or oral modification of the
existing contract were not fully litigated by the parties at
trial as required by Rule 15(b).

Therefore, these issues were

not properly admitted and cannot form the basis for the trial
court's decision.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing points, and the argument contained
in the Appellant's original brief, Wade once again respectfully
requests this Court to order appellee Stangl to convey title of
Wade's property to him pursuant to their written contract.

Wade

also requests an order from this Court remanding this case to the
district court with instructions to determine the proper amount
of taxes attributable to his property under the doctrine of
equitable conversion.

Further, Wade requests this Court to

instruct the district court to determine said taxes based upon
the value of the respective parties' property.
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